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REDD-based Offsets: Benefit Sharing and Risks
In this study we identified promising approaches to effective financial support of Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD) [1].
1. Parties’ risk aversion increases the volume of contracted REDD-based offsets at fair prices.
2. Benefit sharing mechanism increases contracted amount and at the same time decreases the price.
3. Public funds might help closing the price gap and ultimately enable REDD.
Andrey Krasovskii, Nikolay Khabarov, Michael Obersteiner
Ecosystems Services & Management Program
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria
We construct a microeconomic model of interaction between the forest owner
(REDD-supplier), electricity producer, and electricity consumer [2].
The decision-making process of the electricity producer (under uncertain CO2
tax/price) consists of:
1. Choosing power plant load factors to minimize the cost given the hourly
electricity demand profile and installed capacities of particular power
generation technologies;
2. Setting electricity price to maximize the profit based on the demand function
indicating consumer's sensitivity to electricity price;
3. Hedging by REDD-based offsets.
Research Highlights
Technology Annual 
fixed cost, 
thousand
US$/MWy
Variable cost, 
US$/MWh
Installed 
capacity, MW
(≈ size of 
Belarus)
Emission 
factors, ton 
CO2/MWh
Coal-fired 224 18.9 3800 1.02
Natural gas-fired 
combustion turbine
64 55.6 1900 0.55
Natural gas-fired
combined cycle
96 39 2200 0.33
Methodology and Results Technological data for the case-study*
The fair REDD offset price in the study is understood in the sense of parties'
indifference to whether contract a given amount of offsets, or not.
Fair prices represent risk-adjusted supply and demand curves for REDD-
based offsets.
Risk-averse (r.-a.) behavior
considerably increases the
contracted amounts of REDD offsets
and creates a higher potential for
REDD implementation.
Average hourly electricity demand
(based on [7]). Financial instrument supporting REDD
might help avoid bankruptcy of CO2-
intensive producers at high levels of
CO2 price.
Risk preferences are modeled by
exponential utility functions [3].
Fair prices with respect to risk
preferences: α<0 – risk-taking, α≃0
– risk-neutral, α>0 – risk-averse.
Fair prices of the risk-neutral
electricity producer (EP) and forest
owner (FO) depending on the volume
of REDD offsets. The future CO2
price distribution is uniform within the
range 0-80 US$/ton CO2.
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Benefit sharing mechanism increases
contracted amount and at the same time
decreases the price.
* Sources: [4]-[6]. 
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